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Abstract 
Deterrence, a defender’s avoidance of a challenger’s attack based on the threat 
of retaliation, is a basic ingredient of social cooperation in several animal species 
and is ubiquitous in human societies. Deterrence theory has recognized that de-
terrence can only be based on credible threats, but retaliating being costly for 
the defender rules this out in one-shot interactions. If interactions are repeated 
and observable, reputation building has been suggested as a way to sustain cred-
ibility and enable the evolution of deterrence. But this explanation ignores both 
the source and the costs of obtaining information on reputation. Even for small 
information costs successful deterrence is never evolutionarily stable. Here we 
use game-theoretic modelling and agent-based simulations to resolve this puz-
zle and to clarify under which conditions deterrence can nevertheless evolve and 
when it is bound to fail. Paradoxically, rich information on defenders’ past ac-
tions leads to a breakdown of deterrence, while with only minimal information 
deterrence can be highly successful. We argue that reputation-based deterrence 
sheds light on phenomena such as costly punishment and fairness, and might 
serve as a possible explanation for the evolution of informal property rights. 
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Introduction 
Human societies rely to a large extent on cooperation, a form of altruistic in-
teraction where individuals pay a cost for others to receive an even higher ben-
efit [1, 2]. While this phenomenon is readily observable, another type of cooper-
ation is omnipresent in modern societies but hidden from direct observation: 
the absence of committing harmful acts towards others for one’s own benefit. 
Human life is full of opportunities to gain advantages by exploiting others. But 
for most of us the rule is that we do not seize these opportunities. Usually we do 
not lie, we do not steal, and we refrain from killing others for our own gain. Ar-
guably, the absence of these win-small-lose-big interactions is as fundamental to 
the proliferation of civilization as the presence of lose-small-win-big interac-
tions. 
Modern societies have established a multitude of institutions such as laws, 
police forces, and prisons with the main purpose of providing incentives against 
committing hostile acts against others. In ancient human groups where formal 
institutions had not yet been established, informal norms of behavior served as 
disciplining devices, threatening deviators with punishment by group members 
or with ostracism [3–6]. Such a behavior is called deterrence: harmful acts to-
wards others are deterred by the threat of retaliation. This mechanism is funda-
mental for some animal species and specifically for human societies [7–11]. It 
has been suggested that humans have evolved a cognitive “revenge system” that 
implements this deterrence strategy [12]. 
The most basic form of deterrence happens in a one-to-one interaction be-
tween a challenger and a defender, to use the terminology of classical deterrence 
theory. The challenger decides whether or not to attack the defender. If he re-
frains from attacking, the status quo is upheld. If he attacks, the defender decides 
whether or not to retaliate. If she does not retaliate, the challenger wins. If she 
retaliates, conflict ensues. For both parties conflict is the worst outcome, but the 
challenger prefers himself winning to the status quo, while the defender would 
rather maintain the status quo than let the challenger win. The incentive struc-
ture of the deterrence game is general enough to comprise several well known 
games as special cases. Specifically, these include the Entry Deterrence Game, 
the Mini-Ultimatum Game and the Donation Game with Punishment, see Fig 1. 
Deterrence is successful if the challenger expects the defender to retaliate if at-
tacked and therefore refrains from attacking. This simple logic, however, suffers 
from the lack of credibility of the threat of retaliation. While retaliation is costly 
to the attacker, it is also costly to the defender. In a one-shot interaction, a de-
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fender who has been harmed by a challenger’s attack thus gains nothing by re-
taliating and the threat of retaliation remains empty [13–15]. This raises the 
question how successful deterrence might have evolved at all. 
If defenders interact repeatedly with different challengers and interactions 
are observed by others, there is an opportunity for defenders to establish a rep-
utation of being retaliatory by carrying out the threat even though doing so is 
costly in the short run. If challengers can obtain information on defenders’ past 
behavior and tend to avoid attacking “tough” opponents, this strategy might pay 
off in the long run [16–18]. For the Mini-Ultimatum Game- and the Donation 
Game with Punishment-incarnations of the Deterrence Game (see Fig 1) reputa-
tion-based deterrence has indeed been established in various evolutionary mod-
els, e.g. [19–24]. But in these models, information on past behavior of defenders 
is exogenously provided to (some) members of the population at no cost. More-
over, defenders are restricted to use only deterministic strategies, either always 
retaliating or never. Under these assumptions, a challenger who is informed of 
some past action of his current opponent can perfectly anticipate her reaction to 
an attack. This effectively reverses the sequence of decisions. For informed chal-
lengers, the conditional strategy of not attacking retaliators becomes optimal, 
providing a straightforward solution to the deterrence paradox. But assuming 
that information on reputation just falls from heaven has been criticized as ”hard 
to justify” [25]. 
Here we assume that information on defenders’ reputation has to be actively 
and costly acquired by challengers. Whether or not this information is collected 
is a strategic decision that is endogenously determined within the model. This is 
not only the more realistic case, but also the more difficult one for establishing 
deterrence. For example, if a defender population tends to homogenize, with 
most defenders behaving the same way, then it ceases to pay for challengers to 
invest in knowledge about their individual opponent’s past behavior. This again 
destroys defenders’ incentives to uphold a tough reputation and thereby dimin-
ishes the prospects of successful deterrence. 
We show analytically that the fate of a population interacting in the deter-
rence game depends strongly on the economic microfoundations of reputation. 
If challengers are only informed of the last action of their defender, deterrence 
can often evolve. But if they can obtain precise information on the defender’s 
(possibly stochastic) strategy, deterrence inevitably breaks down. Agent-based 
simulations further corroborate that the prospects for deterrence decline with 





Fig 1. Three special cases of deterrence. In the Entry Deterrence Game (EDG) of economics 
textbook fame a potential entrant into a monopolized market can stay out or enter the market. 
If he enters, the (former) monopolist can share the market or start a price war that is detrimental 
to both competitors’ profits. In the Mini-Ultimatum Game the proposer has to divide a sum of 10 
dollars between himself and the responder. A fair division is always implemented. An unfair di-
vision may be accepted or rejected by the responder. In the latter case, no one gets anything. In 
the Donation Game with Punishment, the donor has to decide whether or not to donate to a 
needy recipient. If he doesn’t donate, the recipient may (costly) punish the donor. In all three 




Fig 2. The ownership variant of the deterrence game. If the challenger respects the defender’s 
property of value v, the defender keeps it and the game ends. If the challenger takes possession 
of the defender’s property and she yields, her property changes hands. If the defender fights, 
both parties incur an expected net loss of c. 
Results 
To study the mechanism of deterrence and its possible evolution, we first de-
velop a simplified dynamic game-theoretic model. Consider a large population 
of individuals who are repeatedly randomly matched in pairs. In each matched 
pair, one individual is randomly chosen to play the role of the challenger and the 
other one to play the role of the defender. For concreteness, we frame the situa-
tion as one involving the owner of a valuable resource like food or a tool in the 
defender’s role and a random passerby who has the opportunity to take away 
this resource in the challenger’s role. The challenger may either take (T) the de-
fender’s resource or respect (R) her property. If he respects, his payoff is 0, while 
the defender keeps her resource of value v. 
If the challenger takes, the defender has two possible ways to react. If she 
yields (Y), her resource changes hands and the payoffs are v for the challenger 
and 0 for herself. If she fights back (F), each individual ends up with the resource 
with probability 1/2 in the resulting conflict, but the costs are larger than this 
expected gain, such that the net expected payoff of a fight is −c for both oppo-
nents. Fig 2 shows the sequence of actions and the payoffs in this version of the 
deterrence game. Note that this game seems less general than the ordinal deter-
rence game from Fig 1, since to keep the number of parameters to a minimum 
the value of the resource and the costs of conflict are assumed to be the same for 
both parties. However, our analytical treatment indeed applies to the general 
payoff structure of the deterrence game (see S1 Appendix). 
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In a one-shot interaction, yielding is the optimal reaction to taking, and it is 
also optimal to take from a yielder. (𝑇, 𝑌) is therefore a Nash equilibrium where 
deterrence fails. Successful deterrence, on the other hand, requires the strategy 
combination (𝑅, 𝐹). This is also an equilibrium, since respecting is optimal when 
meeting a defender who is predisposed to fight, and at the same time respecting 
renders both the defender’s (planned) reactions outcome-equivalent and there-
fore optimal for the challenger. However, this deterrence equilibrium is based 
on the defender’s empty threat to fight if her resource is taken and is thus un-
likely to materialize; in game theoretic terms it lacks subgame perfection. The 
same also holds for the range of mixed equilibria where the challenger respects 
and the defender plans to fight with a probability high enough to render respect-
ing optimal. 
 
Costly observation of past behavior 
Without any supporting mechanism, deterrence cannot evolve. As long as some 
takers are present, yielders will always gain more than fighters, and once fight-
ers have largely disappeared, takers take over the population. Observation of a 
defender’s reputation in the form of information about her past behavior opens 
up the possibility of using a discriminatory strategy by taking from “weak” de-
fenders and respecting “tough” ones. This suggests a mechanism allowing deter-
rence to evolve. We therefore assume that a challenger meeting a defender can 
opt to obtain information on the defender’s reputation prior to deciding whether 
or not to take. Reputations are binary and defenders can be classified as tough 
or weak. In previous reputation models [19–24], information was assumed to be 
public or to be observed with a fixed exogenous probability at no cost. In our 
model, observing a defender’s reputation is a challenger’s choice, and it is costly 
to obtain this information. We assume that challengers who check a defender’s 
reputation incur a cost a. In medium-sized real populations this cost is likely to 
be small, as taking part in gossip is often enough to obtain the required infor-
mation. 
We consider three different strategies for challengers. The first two are not 
to check the defender’s reputation and just always to respect (AllR) or always to 
take (AllT). The third is the discriminator strategy that checks the defender’s 
reputation and then takes if and only if the defender is weak (Disc). The three 
remaining possible modes of reacting to obtained reputation information are in-
discriminate respecting (IR), indiscriminate taking (IT), and the paradoxically 
anti-discriminating strategy of taking only from tough defenders (Par). These 
are strictly dominated, however, and will not survive in a population for long. 
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We therefore disregard these strategies in our analytical model, but we include 
them for agent-based simulations. 
Instead of always yielding or always fighting, defenders may also play a ran-
domized stationary strategy, in each interaction fighting with some specific 
probability. This is important because randomizing might be a way to balance 
the need for fighting to obtain a tough reputation and the need for yielding to 
avoid the costs of conflict. We therefore assume that a defender can choose her 
fighting probability Q from the interval [0,1] which includes the pure strategies 
of always fighting and always yielding. We call such an individual a Q-defender. 
Of special importance is the fighting probability 𝑄∗ =
𝑣
𝑐+𝑣
 that leaves challengers 
just indifferent between taking and respecting 
Reputation assessment schemes 
Assessment of a defender’s reputation is undisputed for non-randomizing de-
fenders: pure fighters will have a tough reputation and pure yielders a weak one. 
But there are many different ways to classify defenders who randomize. We con-
sider two different simple schemes that map past behavior to reputations. Under 
the first one, called last-action, a discriminator observes the defender’s last ac-
tion and classifies her accordingly. This scheme is a simple analog to the (binary) 
image scoring scheme of indirect reciprocity [26, 27], but it differs from that one 
insofar as it includes rounds with inaction by the defender, which is not applica-
ble in the image scoring scheme. In our model, you get a tough reputation if you 
fight and a weak reputation if you yield, while you keep your previous reputation 
if your property is respected. 
An important implication is that a defender’s reputation depends not only on 
her fighting probability Q but also on the state of the challenger population. If 
there are many takers, a defender has to react frequently and in any round her 
probability of having a tough reputation will be close to Q. However, if most chal-
lengers are discriminators, a tough reputation, once earned by fighting, is 
“sticky”. Even a low-Q-defender can often keep a tough reputation for a long se-
quence of interactions since discriminators will continue to respect her property 
until a taker comes along and her reputation switches to weak again. This effect 
is not symmetric. A weak reputation is not sticky in this sense, since weak de-
fenders’ resources keep being taken by discriminators. 
The second reputation assessment scheme we consider is the fighting-prob-
ability scheme. Here, discriminators get rich information about the defender’s 
empirical past fighting frequency by observing a high number of past actions. In 
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a limiting case this number is large enough to effectively inform the challenger 
of the defender’s fighting probability Q. An obvious way of classifying a defender 
as weak or tough is then for a discriminating challenger to use a threshold clas-
sification such as “Classify defender as tough (and thus respect) if her empirical 
fighting frequency is higher than ?̅?”, where ?̅? is the threshold value. Hence, un-
der this scheme, we have to distinguish between different discriminator strate-
gies characterized by different ?̅?-values. 
Deterrence is never evolutionarily stable 
A simple static analysis of reputation-based deterrence (see S1 Appendix) shows 
that, irrespective of the reputation assessment scheme, the only evolutionarily 
stable population state (ESS [28]) is the take-and-yield state without any deter-
rence. In such a state, building a reputation is doomed to fail. Mutant fighting 
defenders suffer from numerous costly fights, and mutant respecting challeng-
ers forego the large benefits of undisturbed taking. A state of successful deter-
rence where challengers discriminate and defenders are prepared to fight when-
ever their resources are taken (which, however, doesn’t happen), is not viable, 
since obtaining information on reputations is costly but useless for challengers 
facing a monomorphic defender population. The remaining possible deterrence 
scenario, where always-respecting challengers meet defenders ready to fight, is 
also unstable under selection. If defenders never have to actually react, their 
planned reactions are unconstrained by the forces of selection and can freely 
drift. Once enough yielders have accumulated, taking mutants can proliferate 
and deterrence breaks down. The static ESS analysis therefore fails to explain 
how reputation-based deterrence can survive in the long run. 
This necessitates a closer look at the dynamics of the population game. We 
assume that individuals receive strategy revision opportunities at random 
points in time, and revising individuals best respond to the population state, but 
do so myopically, such that strategy revisions follow so-called best response dy-
namics [29–31]. This captures individuals’ bounded rationality better than the 
traditional replicator dynamics [32] that require genetic inheritance, reinforce-
ment learning, or a special kind of imitative behavior [33–35]. Under best re-
sponse dynamics, behavior in the two roles evolves independently, and the evo-
lutionary dynamics can be analyzed as if challengers and defenders were mem-
bers of two distinct populations. 
9 
 
Deterrence may evolve with minimal information 
We first consider the last-action reputation assessment scheme (see S1 Appen-
dix). We find that under this scheme, randomizing is always dominated by either 
fighting or yielding for defenders. After randomizers have disappeared, only 
pure fighters and pure yielders are left in the defender population. The state 
space can be projected to a rectangle to visualize the evolutionary dynamics in a 
convenient way, see Fig 3. This then allows the construction of the (projected) 





Fig 3. The two populations’ combined state space is a uniform triangular prism. This prism 
is divided into two regions by a plane on which fighters and yielders do equally well. Using the 
line of intersection of this plane with a triangular side of the prism as line-of-sight, the prism can 
be visualized as a rectangle in which the defenders’ indifference plane is a line parallel to the 
base of the rectangle. 
 
The state space is divided into two regions by the defenders’ indifference 
plane that appears as the interior horizontal line in Fig 4. Above the line, yielders 
do better than fighters and all paths move to the left. Below the line, the direction 
of best response paths is reversed. Unconditional taking is optimal if yielders are 
numerous, while unconditional respecting is optimal if most defenders are pre-
pared to fight. For intermediate mixtures of yielders and fighters, challengers 
switch to discrimination. The shaded region in Fig 4 is the basin of attraction of 
the no-deterrence ESS (𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑇, 𝑌 ). This region is small for the (realistic) parame-
ter range where the costs of information are small compared to the costs of 
fighting. Outside of the ESS’ attraction basin, populations converge to the 
10 
(𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑅, 𝐹) equilibrium. This equilibrium is part of a component of equilibria 
where challengers always respect and a large fraction of defenders are prepared 
to fight. While the polymorphic equilibria are individually unstable, the equilib-
rium component itself is evolutionarily stable. If a small fraction of individuals 
“mutates” and starts to experiment with different strategies, they are eventually 




Fig 4. Projected best response paths for the evolutionary deterrence game. For initial pop-
ulation states close to the no-deterrence ESS (𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑇, 𝑌) deterrence fails to evolve. The shaded re-
gion is the basin of attraction of this anarchistic ESS. Outside this region, best response paths 
converge to the deterrence equilibrium at (𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑅, 𝐹). This equilibrium is embedded in a stable 
component of equilibria with full deterrence. Discriminators die out in the long run, but they 
play an important role in steering evolving populations to full deterrence. Parameter values: 𝑣 =
 𝑐 =  1, 𝑎 =  0.2. 
 
The game dynamics exhibit the decisive role of discrimination. While dis-
criminators are completely absent in both attracting population states, discrim-
ination is nevertheless responsible for the evolution of successful deterrence. Its 
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presence, though only temporary, makes fighting worthwhile, and when dis-
criminators finally disappear, fighters stay and challengers respect most of the 
time. In this sense discrimination acts as a catalyst for successful deterrence. As 
a consequence, reputation-based deterrence works well under quite minimal in-
formation, where observation of the last action only of a defender is possible at 
some cost. This corresponds to what can be observed in most real-world set-
tings: We live under a norm of informal private property rights, where most of 
us do not even consider taking the belongings of others for personal gain, and 
even those who do consider it expect their opponents to fight for their posses-
sions, and rightly so. 
Deterrence breaks down if information is too rich 
Intuition suggests that if minimal information is good, rich information should 
be even better. Analysis of our second type of reputation assessment, the 
fighting-probability scheme, reveals that this intuition fails in the evolutionary 
deterrence game. The reason is that under the fighting-probability scheme, in 
contrast to the last-action scheme, randomizing may be optimal for defenders 
(see S1 Appendix). As long as randomizing defenders with diverse fighting prob-
abilities are present, discriminators will tend to use 𝑄∗  as their classification 
threshold. But once this threshold has become common among discriminators, 
defenders’ fighting probabilities cluster at 𝑄∗ and eventually display so little di-
versity that discrimination loses its advantage and starts to decline. In the end, 
deterrence breaks down and the population converges to all-out take-and-yield. 
In this scenario, individuals are effectively victims of a social dilemma: While 
each individual challenger naturally prefers rich to minimal information, soci-
ety-wide availability of rich information leads to anarchy. 
Agent-based simulations 
The results presented here and proven in S1 Appendix have been derived from 
a simplified analytical model under strong assumptions and in limit scenarios: 
An infinitely large population, infinitely many interactions between strategy re-
visions, revising individuals exactly knowing the current population state and 
being perfectly able to calculate a best response, without noise and in the ab-
sence of errors in strategy execution or reputation assessment. It is thus ques-
tionable whether these results continue to hold under more realistic assump-
tions. Crucially, if defenders experiment with non-optimal strategies and if indi-
viduals have only a vague idea of which behaviors are optimal, their behavior 
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becomes much more heterogeneous, which might invalidate some of the analyt-
ical arguments based on homogeneity of defenders. As a robustness check we 
therefore also conducted agent-based simulations which relax these strong as-
sumptions and test for a variety of different parameter values. 
Specifically, we modelled a large but finite population of N agents where ini-
tially all strategies, including the dominated ones, are present in roughly equal 
proportions. In each round, all agents are matched in pairs. Strategies for a given 
role may be switched if a revision opportunity arrives, which happens inde-
pendently with probability u after each round for each agent. Information on 
reputations is subjected to noise by setting the defender’s image to the wrong 
one with some small probability δ. With another small probability , an agent 
commits an implementation error and plays the wrong action. Moreover, in each 
round, with some small probability µ an agent experiments and switches to a 
randomly chosen strategy. We keep track of each agent’s payoffs and after each 
round add the current payoff to the discounted sum of the agent’s past payoffs, 
using a discount factor d. This sum can be interpreted as an agent’s “wealth”, a 
stock variable which is easier to observe in a social group than payoff flows (“in-
come”). Agents do not calculate best responses. Rather, each agent has a group 
of NF friends whose wealth levels and strategies she monitors. Upon revising, an 
agent simply imitates the strategy with maximal average empirical wealth level 
among those used by her friends. 
The results we obtained from agent-based simulations corroborate the im-
plications of our analytical model. Under the last-action reputation scheme, sin-
gle runs eventually either hover around a state where most takings are success-
fully deterred (Fig 5) or converge to the vicinity of the no-deterrence ESS, de-
pending on parameters. If information costs a are small relative to fighting costs 
c, deterrence prevails in the long run (Fig 6). 
Increasing an agent’s “memory length” allows us to interpolate between our 
two extreme reputation assessment schemes. Let us assume that for any given 
memory length k discriminators always use the classification scheme according 
to whether or not a defender’s empirical fighting frequency among her last k re-






Fig 5. Evolution of deterrence in an example run of an agent-based simulation under the 
last-action reputation scheme. In the beginning, yielders (using strategy 𝑄 = 0, bright yellow) 
do best against the resident challengers, since takings are frequent. At the same time, discrimi-
nators (light blue) grow in frequency because discrimination pays off in the presence of a highly 
diverse defender population. However, this increases the value of having a tough reputation, and 
fighters (𝑄 = 1, red) become more numerous. As soon as the defenders’ average fighting proba-
bility is high enough, unconditional respecting (dark blue) takes over as it avoids paying the in-
formation costs. The frequency of this strategy oscillates around approximately 0.7, followed by 
discrimination with a frequency of approximately 0.2. Defenders’ property is mostly respected 
and just a small amount of taking and fighting remains. Parameter values: 𝑣 = 1, 𝑐 = 1.5, 𝑎 =
0.1, 𝑁 = 104, 𝑁𝐹 = 100, 𝑑 = 0.9, 𝑢 = 10





Fig 6. Long term challengers’ and defenders’ strategy frequencies if reputations are deter-
mined by last-action. If the costs c of fighting are low, deterrence fails and takers and yielders 
prevail. For high fighting costs, most challengers respect and deterrence is able to evolve. For 
intermediate fighting costs deterrence can also be based on discrimination if information costs 
are very small. Successful deterrence leads to low selection pressure for defender strategies and 
fighting probabilities vary widely. Parameter values: 𝑣 = 1, 𝑁 = 104, 𝑁𝐹 = 100, 𝑑 = 0.9, 𝑢 =






Fig 7. The breakdown of deterrence in an example run under the (empirical) fighting-fre-
quency scheme proceeds over three stages. (i) In the beginning, yielders (strategy Q = 0, 
bright yellow) do best against the resident challengers, since taking is frequent. At the same time, 
discriminators (light blue) grow in frequency because discrimination pays off in the presence of 
a highly diverse defender population. (ii) When discriminators are numerous, yielding gives way 
to intermediate fighting probabilities close to 𝑄∗ (orange) for defenders. Discrimination loses its 
value and is displaced by respecting (dark blue), thereby (iii) initiating a comeback of yielders. 
This invites unconditional takers (red) who eventually take over the challenger role, while yield-
ing dominates the defender role. Parameter values: 𝑣 = 1, 𝑐 = 1.5, 𝑎 = 0.1, 𝑁 = 104, 𝑁𝐹 =
100, 𝑑 = 0.9, 𝑢 = 10−2, 𝜇 = 𝜖 = 𝛿 = 10−3 . Here, 𝑄∗ = 0.4 and 35 past actions are observed. 
 
Then 𝑘 = 1 corresponds to the last-action scheme while large values of k ap-
proximate the fighting-probability scheme, provided strategy revisions are suf-
ficiently rare. With a higher number of past actions observed, discriminators get 
richer information and therefore more precise estimates of their matched de-
fenders’ fighting probability Q, but the ensuing tendency of these fighting prob-
abilities to flock close to 𝑄∗ weakens challengers’ incentives to invest in discrim-
ination and therefore decreases the prospects of deterrence (Fig 7). 
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Our simulations show that defenders’ average payoffs decline approximately 
linearly in memory length until at some critical number of past actions observed, 




Fig 8. Dependence of average challenger and defender long term payoffs on the number 
of observations if reputations are determined by empirical fighting frequencies. With only 
a single observation, the fighting-frequency scheme coincides with the last-action scheme. De-
fender payoff is high if the number of observations is small and deterrence can evolve. As the 
number of observations grows, defender payoff slowly declines first and then suddenly drops 
below zero when deterrence breaks down. For challengers, the situation is reversed. Parameter 
values: 𝑣 = 1, 𝑐 = 1.5, 𝑎 = 0.1, 𝑁 = 104, 𝑁𝐹 = 100, 𝑑 = 0.9, 𝑢 = 10
−2, 𝜇 = 𝜖 = 𝛿 = 10−3. Payoffs 
are averaged over rounds 8000 − 10000 from 100 runs. 
 
Discussion 
The proposed mechanism behind the evolution of deterrence based on reputa-
tion is reminiscent of the explanation of the evolution of cooperation by indirect 
reciprocity. These models are based on the prisoner’s dilemma or its one-sided 
variant, the donation game, where a donor can pay a small cost to provide a large 
benefit to a passive recipient. Discriminators withhold cooperation (donating) 
with individuals who have been observed to defect (denying donations) in the 
past, thereby providing others with an incentive to cooperate [26, 36–39]. 
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Withholding donations to previous defectors might be viewed as thirdparty 
retaliation, but this mechanism suffers from the problem of justified defection: 
If a discriminator defects against a defector, she might earn a bad reputation 
herself. No such difficulties arise in the deterrence game. Individuals in the role 
of a challenger discriminate based on their opponent’s past behavior as defend-
ers only, and the separation of these two roles avoids the need to distinguish 
between “justified” and “unjustified” retaliations. 
Evolution of costly punishment and fairness 
Costly punishment [11, 40] has mainly been studied as an add-on to a prisoner’s 
dilemma or a public goods game [23, 41–45]. It has been shown, however, that 
stabilizing cooperative social outcomes by threats of punishment often fails to 
work, and costly punishment has therefore been suggested to have evolved for 
other reasons [46, 47]. In our model, retaliation can be viewed as a special vari-
ant of costly punishment that is not confounded with decisions of whether or not 
to cooperate in a prisoner’s dilemma or a public goods game. 
Our study suggests that an explanation for costly punishment might be found 
in its value as a reputation-based deterrence device in environments where re-
cent punishment events are observable at some cost. As our results also apply to 
the Mini-Ultimatum Game variant of deterrence, an interpretation of reputation-
based deterrence as a possible mechanism for the evolution of “fairness” is sug-
gestive. By unswervingly rejecting unfair offers responders acquire a reputation 
as tough bargainers, allowing fair offers to prevail in the long run. 
Evolution of private property rights 
Legal scholars are well aware of the hypothesis that modern property law has 
roots in evolutionary biology [48, 49], and biologists have studied animal terri-
toriality for decades: Individuals of many species seem to grant ownership of a 
territory to whichever individual arrived there first. This phenomenon has been 
famously explained by the bourgeois strategy which is an ESS of the Hawk-Dove-
Bourgeois game and prescribes to play Hawk if owner and Dove if intruder [50]. 
However, there is a fundamental symmetry in the Hawk-Dove game, by 
which there exists another strategy, the anti-bourgeois strategy, prescribing the 
exact opposite behavior, Dove if owner, and Hawk if intruder [28, 51]). This 
strategy also constitutes an ESS that has been called the paradoxical ESS or the 
anti-private-property equilibrium, since the associated behavior is counterintu-
itive and almost nonexistent in nature. The fundamental symmetry of the Hawk-
Dove game does not allow for a satisfactory explanation for the absence of these 
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anti-private-property equilibria unless one introduces exogenous asymmetries 
between owners and intruders into the model, such as differing valuations of the 
property, differing contestability, or an endowment effect [52, 53]. 
Theorists trying to explain the prevalence of the private-property equilib-
rium have developed sophisticated game-theoretic models focusing on the be-
havior of nonhuman animals competing for territories. These models are mainly 
built on variants of the Hawk-Dove game [54–57]. Our model aims to describe 
human behavior and therefore relies on a fundamentally different mechanism, 
reputation-based deterrence, to explain the evolution of informal property 
rights. While we cannot eliminate the no-deterrence ESS that corresponds to the 
anti-private-property equilibrium, our dynamic analysis reveals that its basin of 
attraction is quite small for small information costs. This might be a reason why 
the anarchistic ESS is unlikely to get established in human populations. 
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S1 Appendix: Analytical Results for the General Pay-
off Structure 
Analytical results for the last-action reputation assessment 
scheme 
 
For the general payoff structure of the deterrence game we use parameters v and 
c for defenders and v’ and c’ for challengers as shown in Fig. A1. The latter are 
then indifferent between taking and respecting if the defender’s fighting proba-
bility is 𝑄∗ =  
𝑣′
𝑐′+𝑣′
. We first consider only pure strategies. Denote the challeng-
ers’ pure strategy set by 𝑆1  =  {𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑅, 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑇, 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐, 𝐼𝑅, 𝐼𝑇, 𝑃𝑎𝑟}, and let  𝑆2 =  {𝐹, 𝑌} 
be the defenders’ pure strategy set. The payoff for an individual playing (𝐵, 𝐶) ∈
𝑆 = 𝑆1 × 𝑆2  against an individual playing (𝐷, 𝐸) ∈ 𝑆  is given by 






𝜋2(𝐷, 𝐶), where the payoff functions 𝜋1 and 𝜋2 
are the ones of challenger and defender, respectively, in the asymmetric evolu-













From the payoff bimatrix it is clear that the last three challenger strategies 
are strictly dominated. We therefore henceforth ignore these strategies here. In-
spection reveals that the pure-strategy Nash equilibria are (AllR, F) and (AllT, Y). 
Only the latter one is strict, however. Since in asymmetric games (and their sym-
metrizations), ESS’ correspond to strict Nash equilibria, there is only a single 
ESS, the strategy pair (𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑇, 𝑌), in which deterrence fails. 
 
 
Fig. A1. The general payoff structure of the deterrence game. The value of the resource and 
the costs of fighting, respectively, may be different for challengers and defenders. 
 
 𝐹 𝑌 
AllR 0, 𝑣 0, 𝑣 
AllT −𝑐‘, −𝑐 𝑣‘, 0 
Disc −𝑎, 𝑣 𝑣‘ − 𝑎, 0 
IR −𝑎, 𝑣 −𝑎, 𝑣 
IT −𝑐‘ − 𝑎, −𝑐 𝑣‘– 𝑎, 0 
Par −𝑐‘ − 𝑎, −𝑐 −𝑎, 𝑣 
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Let ∆(𝑆1) be the space of probability distributions p on S1. Now imagine a Q-
defender playing against a challenger population in state 𝑝 ∈ ∆(𝑆1). Let g be her 
current probability of having a tough reputation. Then after her next match her 
probability g’ of having a tough reputation can be calculated by considering the 
following: Having a tough reputation after the match can result from three dif-
ferent scenarios. First, the defender initially had a tough reputation and was 
matched with an AllR- or a Disc-challenger, thus being respected, which leaves 
her reputation unchanged. This occurs with probability 𝑔(𝑝𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑅 + 𝑝𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐). Second, 
she initially had a tough reputation, got matched with an AllT-challenger and re-
acted by fighting. This has probability 𝑔𝑝𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑄. Third, she initially had a weak 
reputation but met an AllT- or a Disc-challenger and reacted by fighting. The 
probability for this chain of events is (1– 𝑔)(𝑝𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑇 +  𝑝𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐)𝑄. Adding these three 
probabilities results in 𝑔’ = (𝑝𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑅 + 𝑝𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐 − 𝑄𝑝𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐)𝑔 + 𝑄(𝑝𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑇 + 𝑝𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐). Iterating 
this procedure for constant p shows that for a Q-defender the probability of hav-




, whenever the denominator is nonzero. For simplicity we assume 
from now on that 𝑝𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑇 > 0, which ensures that 𝑔(𝑝, 𝑄) is always well-defined. 
𝑔(𝑝, 𝑄) increases monotonically in Q from 𝑔(𝑝, 0) = 0 to 𝑔(𝑝, 1) = 1. 
The expected payoff for a Q-defender depends on 𝑔(𝑝, 𝑄) and therefore is 
nonlinear in Q. A Q-defender receives v if she meets an AllR-challenger or if she 
meets a discriminator and has a tough reputation, thus being respected. She 
loses c whenever she either meets a taker and fights back or she meets a dis-
criminator when having a weak reputation and fights back. Combining the cor-
responding probabilities results in a payoff for a Q-defender of 𝜋2(𝑝, 𝑄) =
[𝑝𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑅 + 𝑔(𝑝, 𝑄)𝑝𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐]𝑣 − [𝑝𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑇 + 𝑝𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐 − 𝑔(𝑝, 𝑄)𝑝𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐]𝑐𝑄. 
Best response dynamics 
We assume that strategy updating is guided by the social learning process 
known as the best-response dynamics (BR-dynamics) [29–31]. Since the BR-dy-
namics is defined for games with finitely many pure strategies, we define 𝑆𝑄 =
{0, 𝑄∗, 1, … } to be any finite discretization of the defenders’ pure strategy space 
including at least 0, 1, and 𝑄∗ . Let ∆(𝑆𝑄) be the space of mixed strategies, i.e. 
probability distributions over SQ. Denoting the population state by 𝑥(𝑡) ∈
∆(𝑆1 × 𝑆𝑄), this results in 𝑥(𝑡) moving along (possibly non-unique) solutions, 
called best response paths (BR-paths), of the differential inclusion ?̇?(𝑡) ∈
𝐵𝑅(𝑥(𝑡)) − 𝑥(𝑡), where 𝐵𝑅(𝑥) is the set of (pure or mixed) best responses to the 
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population state x. As long as the current best response is unique, the BR-path 
describes a straight line in the state space pointing to the current pure best re-
sponse. If a BR-path converges, the limit is a Nash equilibrium. 
We assume two separate time-scales here: a slow one for the best response 
dynamics of the population state x and a fast one for the adaptation of the repu-
tations of Q-defenders to their stationary values for fixed x. This allows us to as-
sume that reputations are instantly equilibrated while the population state 
moves through the state space. 
Now we set out to find the long-run behavior of the population state in the 
symmetrized game under BR-dynamics. Though the state space ∆(𝑆1 × 𝑆𝑄) has 
dimension 3|𝑆𝑄| − 1 (which is at least 8), the task is greatly simplified by the fol-
lowing two steps, which we use to sequentially reduce the state space we have 
to analyze. 
Step 1: De-symmetrizing the game 
Consider the projection from ∆(𝑆1 × 𝑆𝑄)  to ∆(𝑆1) × ∆(𝑆𝑄) which separates a 
mixed strategy 𝑥 ∈ ∆(𝑆1 × 𝑆𝑄) into its corresponding pair of marginal distribu-
tions (𝑝(𝑥), 𝑞(𝑥)) ∈ ∆(𝑆1) × ∆(𝑆𝑄). This projection respects the best response 
structure of the game and therefore maps BR-paths 𝑥(𝑡)of the symmetrized 
game to BR-paths (𝑝(𝑡), 𝑞(𝑡)) of the corresponding asymmetric game given by 
the role-contingent payoff functions 𝜋1 and 𝜋2, as demonstrated in [1]. With a 
little abuse of notation, we stick to denoting the defender’s payoff function by π2 
when we extend her strategy space from 𝑆2 to 𝑆𝑄 by including all feasible mixed 
strategies Q. Here, (𝑝(𝑡), 𝑞(𝑡)) is a BR-path of the corresponding asymmetric 
(two-populations) game, i.e. a solution to the system of differential inclusions 
(?̇?(𝑡), ?̇?(𝑡)) ∈ (𝐵1(𝑞(𝑡)), 𝐵2(𝑝(𝑡)) ) − (𝑝(𝑡), 𝑞(𝑡)), where B1 and B2 are the re-
spective best response correspondences of challengers and defenders in the 
asymmetric evolutionary deterrence game. 
From the long-run behavior of the population state in this game we can then 
infer the long-run behavior of the population state in the symmetrized game. 
This allows us to reduce the dimension of the state space we are working in from 
3|𝑆𝑄| − 1 to 2|𝑆𝑄| − 2. 
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Step 2: Eliminating strictly dominated strategies 
Under BR-dynamics updating players never switch to strictly dominated strate-
gies, hence such strategies are eliminated quickly. It thus suffices to study the 
BR-dynamics in the reduced evolutionary deterrence game after eliminating 
strictly dominated strategies. Note that we have already discarded the challeng-
ers’ strictly dominated strategies IR, IT, and Par. Turning to defenders, substitut-
ing for 𝑔(𝑝, 𝑄) and for 𝑝𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑅 in the expression for a Q-defender’s expected payoff 











It follows that there exists an indifference hyperplane 𝑀 ∶= 𝑀1 × ∆(𝑆𝑄), with 
𝑀1 ∶= {𝑝 | 𝑝𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐 =
𝑐
𝑣
𝑝𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑇}, that separates the state space into two regions. There-
fore, if 𝑝𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐 >
𝑐
𝑣




𝑝𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑇 it is strictly decreasing. In the indifference hyperplane, the de-
fender’s payoff is given by 𝜋2(𝑝, 𝑄)  =  𝑣 − 𝑝𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑇(𝑐 + 𝑣)  for all Q. As a conse-
quence, whenever the population state is not in the hyperplane M, a defender’s 
best response is either 𝑄 =  0 or 𝑄 =  1, i.e. Y or F, while all 𝑄 ∈ 𝑆𝑄 are optimal 
if (𝑝, 𝑞)  ∈  𝑀. 
Allowing defenders to randomize thus turns out to be inconsequential for the 
model, since randomizing, i.e. using 0 <  𝑄 <  1, is only optimal if playing a pure 
strategy F or Y is also optimal. (The same result holds trivially for randomizing 
challengers, since their expected payoffs are linear functions of their randomi-
zation probabilities anyways.) We can therefore proceed under the simplifying 
assumption that individuals use only pure strategies from the outset. Eliminat-
ing the unused randomizing strategies from the game results in the reduced evo-
lutionary deterrence game. We again simplify notation by sticking to 𝜋1 and 𝜋2 
for the payoff functions and return to denoting the pure strategy sets by 𝑆1 and 
𝑆2. The two-population version of this game is a standard evolutionary bimatrix 
game comprising the strategies AllR, AllT, and Disc for challengers and F and Y 







The reduced game is only interesting if obtaining information is not prohibi-
tively costly, i.e. if Disc is not dominated by a mixture of AllR and AllT. A quick 
calculation shows that for this we have to assume 𝑎 <
𝑣′𝑐′
𝑣′+𝑐′
, which we will do 
henceforth. We have now reduced the dimension of the state space from at least 
8 to 3. The remaining task is to solve for the long-run behavior of the BR-dynam-
ics. 
The reduced evolutionary deterrence game is a two-person game where one 
of the players has only two strategies. For this class of games it is known that all 
BR-paths converge to the set of Nash equilibria. Moreover, a suitable projection 
𝑃: ∆(𝑆1) × ∆(𝑆2) → [0,1] × [−𝑣, 𝑐] allows one to analyze the global dynamics in 
these games in two dimensions (see [2] for details). The projection P is chosen 
in such a way that the plane of indifference of the defender is projected to the 
horizontal axis, corresponding to the visualization in the main text. With a slight 
abuse of notation, we denote this plane by M again. P maps the state space 
∆(𝑆1) × ∆(𝑆2)  and its partition into 6 best response regions to the rectangle 
[0,1] × [−𝑣, 𝑐], partitioned into 6 rectangles in the plane. For population states 
(𝑝, 𝑞) =  ((𝑝𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑅 , 𝑝𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑇 , 𝑝𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐), (𝑞𝐹 , 𝑞𝑌)) ∈ ∆(𝑆1) × ∆(𝑆2)  the projection map P is 
given by 𝑃(𝑝, 𝑞)  =  (𝑞𝐹, 𝛿(𝑝)) , where 𝛿(𝑝) ∶=  𝜋2(𝑝, 𝑌 ) − 𝜋2(𝑝, 𝐹)  is the de-
fenders’ payoff advantage of Y over F if the challengers’ population state is p. We 
call 𝑃(𝑝, 𝑞) the induced population state. 
P is linear and therefore maps BR-paths (𝑝(𝑡), 𝑞(𝑡)) in the reduced game to 
piecewise linear so-called induced paths (𝑞𝐹(𝑡), 𝛿(𝑝(𝑡))) in the rectangle [0,1] ×
[−𝑣, 𝑐]. The behavior of these induced paths is easy to study and allows one to 
obtain the behavior of BR-paths in the reduced game and, by reversing Steps 2 
and 1 of the reduction of dimensions above, in the asymmetric evolutionary de-
terrence game and finally in the original symmetric evolutionary deterrence 
game. 
Since the projection map P is linear, piecewise linear BR-paths pointing to 
pure strategy pairs are mapped to piecewise linear induced paths pointing to 
points on the boundary of the induced state space (the rectangle [0,1] × [−𝑣, 𝑐]) 
 𝐹 𝑌 
AllR 0, 𝑣 0, 𝑣 
AllT −𝑐‘, −𝑐 𝑣‘, 0 
Disc −𝑎, 𝑣 𝑣‘ − 𝑎, 0 
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in the plane. The remaining analysis of induced paths amounts to a simple exer-
cise in planar geometry as shown in Fig. 4 in the main text. 
By construction of P, defenders switch to yielding if the induced population 
state is above the horizontal axis and they switch to fighting if it is below the 
horizontal axis. Induced paths therefore move to the left above and to the right 
below the horizontal axis. 
If qF is large, i.e. if most defenders are prepared to fight, challengers switch to 
always respecting (AllR), since neither taking nor obtaining information pays off. 
In the rightmost vertical sector, therefore, induced paths point to one of the 
boundary points of the horizontal axis. This is the case for 𝑞𝐹 > 1 −
𝑎
𝑣′
. If 𝑞𝐹 is in 
the intermediary range  
𝑎
𝑐′
< 𝑞𝐹 < 1 −
𝑎
𝑣′
 , the discriminating strategy Disc be-
comes optimal for challengers. In the middle vertical sector induced paths there-




 , it does no longer pay to discriminate and challengers turn to 
always taking (AllT). In the leftmost vertical sector induced paths therefore point 
to one of the top vertices of the rectangle. 
The payoff bimatrix of the reduced game shows that it admits a strict Nash 
equilibrium at (𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑇, 𝑌). This Nash equilibrium is asymptotically stable under 
BR-dynamics, since it is the unique best response to all nearby population states. 
It constitutes the no-deterrence ESS where challengers always take and defend-
ers always yield. However, a quick calculation shows that for small information 
costs a the relative size of this equilibrium’s basin of attraction, depicted as the 
shaded region in Fig 4, is about 𝑎
𝑐′+2𝑣′
2𝑣′(𝑐′+𝑣′)
 , which shrinks to zero with a. The 
mixed equilibrium with 𝑞𝐹 =
𝑎
𝑐′
 , 𝑝𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑅 = 0, 𝑝𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑇 =
𝑣
𝑐+𝑣
, and 𝑝𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐 =
𝑐
𝑐+𝑣
 , is sad-
dle-like and therefore unstable. Its stable manifold separates the basins of at-
traction of the anarchistic ESS and the deterrence equilibrium. 
The deterrence equilibrium (𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑅, 𝐹) is only semistable: In a small neighbor-
hood it attracts all paths from the half-space with 𝛿(𝑝)  <  0 and repels all paths 
with 𝛿(𝑝)  >  0. But this equilibrium is part of a 1-dimensional equilibrium com-
ponent  {(𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑅, 𝑞)| 𝑞𝑌 ≤
𝑎
𝑣′
}, which itself is asymptotically stable and has a large 
basin of attraction for small a. The equilibria in this component are behaviorally 
indistinguishable, since defenders’ property rights are always respected. The 
equilibrium (𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑅, 𝐹) attracts all paths in some neighborhood of this component, 
excluding the component itself. Within the equilibrium component, movement 
is indeterminate as there are infinitely many BR-paths originating from each 
equilibrium, moving back and forth arbitrarily within the component. 
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The analysis also shows that if we let 𝑎 →  0, there is a discontinuity in the 
long-run outcome. While for arbitrarily small 𝑎 > 0 the population always typi-
cally ends up at (𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑅, 𝐹), this is not the case for completely costless information: 
If 𝑎 =  0, Disc becomes a weakly dominant strategy for challengers and all inte-
rior BR-paths converge to (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐, 𝐹). 
Analytical results for the fighting-probability reputation as-
sessment scheme 
 
As shown above, for a defender randomizing with fighting probability Q the 




For all other past actions, the corresponding probability is simply Q. Thus, her 
empirical fighting frequency calculated from the last k actions converges to Q as 
𝑘 →  ∞, provided that, as we assume here, her last switch appeared before those 
k actions were carried out. In the limiting case, a discriminator is therefore in-
formed of the defender’s true fighting probability Q. The optimal strategy for a 
discriminating challenger is then to take if 𝑄 < 𝑄∗ and to respect if 𝑄 > 𝑄∗, i.e. 
to use the 𝑄∗-threshold strategy. We denote this strategy by Disc again. Against 
a taker, yielding (𝑄 = 0) is the best response for defenders and against a Disc-
challenger it is clearly optimal to use 𝑄∗ (assuming w.l.o.g. that discriminators 
respect if indifferent). All other fighting probabilities are never optimal except if 
there are no takers in the challenger population. 
 
After eliminating the suboptimal fighting probabilities for defenders, the 




Substituting for 𝑄∗ this payoff bimatrix becomes (𝜋1, 𝜋2) = 
 𝑄∗ 𝑌 
AllR 0, 𝑣 0, 𝑣 
AllT 𝑣′ − 𝑄∗(𝑣′ + 𝑐′), −𝑐𝑄∗ 𝑣′, 0 




It follows that always taking is weakly dominant for challengers. Therefore, 
all interior BR-paths converge to the anarchistic ESS (𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑇, 𝑌). 
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 𝑄∗ 𝑌 
AllR 0, 𝑣 0, 𝑣 
AllT 0, −𝑐𝑣′/(𝑣′ + c′) 𝑣′, 0 
Disc −𝑎, 𝑣 𝑣′ − 𝑎, 0 
